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Executive Summary
Top Down Strategy – Airspace Safety
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To maintain current levels 
of safety, the transformed 
NAS will need different 
safety mechanisms and 
protections than our 
present NAS.
*Risks here refers to safety-related risks; which may be mitigated during operations or during design.
SWS Project Goal: To develop 
and demonstrate innovative 
safety-oriented solutions that 
enable modernization and 
aviation transformation.
In our current system, we treat 
design safety and operational 
safety very differently.
Executive Summary
Top Down Strategy – Operational Safety
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Current NAS 
Relies on humans in loop to: 
• Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate 
hazards and risks
Ground- and satellite-based 
surveillance
*Risks here refers to safety-related risks; which may be mitigated during operations or during design.
Transformed NAS 
Will rely on new data/sensors 
and automation or autonomy 
to:
• Monitor, assess and 
mitigate hazards and 
risks 
Mix of ground-based, 
infrastructure-embedded, and 
vehicle sensor payloads.
Executive Summary
Top Down Strategy – Operational Safety
4
Current NAS 
Relies on humans in loop to: 
• Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate 
hazards and risks
Ground- and satellite-based 
surveillance
*Risks here refers to safety-related risks; which may be mitigated during operations or during design.
Transformed NAS 
Will rely on new 
data/sensors and 
automation or autonomy to:
• Monitor, assess and 
mitigate hazards and 
risks 
Mix of ground-based, 
infrastructure-embedded, 
and vehicle sensor payloads.
Note: Due to the required functionality, 
the new operational risk detection and 
mitigation system will almost certainly 
be autonomous and complex.
Executive Summary
Top Down Strategy – Design Safety
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Current NAS 
Relies on time-intensive, 
testing-based assurance.
Complexity and decision-
making are pushed to 
human operators 
(licensed, not certified). 
Testing-based processes 
not conducive to  
autonomy or to rapid 
development.
*Risks here refers to safety-related risks; which may be mitigated during operations or during design.
Transformed NAS 
• Will rely on automated, 
mathematically-proven and 
evidence-based assurance in 
a way that allows the 
strategic and low-risk use of 
machine-learning enabled 
components.
• Can rapidly determine the 
assurance impact of design 
changes, new vehicles and 
new operations.
.
Future Operational Time Safety
Supports the 2025-2035 NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) In-Time 
System Wide Safety Assurance (Thrust 5) Vision by early analysis and prototyping of 
operational safety services that 
q monitor for
q known risks and 
q anomalies that may become risks/threats,
q assess overall risks and look for hazard precursors and safety trends, and
q mitigate risks/hazards, either by
q alerting an operator, or
q automatically taking an action to mitigate risks.
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Barriers to Future Operational Time Safety
• Increased variety and scale of operations means that people can no longer be the 
safety gatekeepers, or the people will be the bottleneck 
• Automating safety monitoring assessment and mitigation requires several changes to 
operations and new technical solutions:
• Increased data sharing so that all the data is available to automated decision makers
• Increased data fusion so that decision-making algorithms have all necessary information
• Predictive algorithms that can reach the appropriate conclusions 
• Confidence in the conclusions so that automated mitigation is possible
• There are also social barriers to achieving this vision – NASA can educate and inform 
for these barriers but will not directly address:
• Privacy concerns
• Data rights
• We partially address societal trust in automation and evidence by providing 
evidence for reliability in Technical Challenge 4.
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Operational-Time Safety Technical Challenges
• NASA has chosen two technical challenges:
• Integrated Risk Assessment for the Terminal Area
• Demonstrates data fusion and automated risk analysis benefits and costs in a domain where the 
data currently exists
• NASA has demonstrated expertise and leadership in this domain
• NASA has airline partners who want these capabilities and are willing to share necessary data and 
dedicate resources for a cost-benefit analysis
• In-Flight Safety Predictions for Emerging Operations
• Increased levels of autonomy will happen with small UAS first because of mission risk profiles
• Many emerging entrants do not realize that our current level of aviation safety is due to forensic 
analysis, and that accidents can kill an emerging market. NASA is a trusted intermediary between 
industry and the regulators.
• NASA is the best vector for making sure that safety is an inherent part of UTM
• Operational safety techniques for UTM are immediately applicable for UAM
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In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance
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TC2: In-Flight Safety 
Predictions for Emerging 
Operations (Now-FY25)
TC1: Integrated Risk 
Assessment for the 
Terminal Area (Now-FY23)
eTC6: Information System 
Architectures and Services to 
Support In-Time Aviation Safety 
Management (FY21-27)
Operational 
Safety for the 
Transformed NAS
We start by working with our airline partners to build out ISSA capabilities (monitor and 
assess) in the terminal area, where we have the data available and can produce 
immediate societal benefit.
TC1: Integrated Risk Assessment for the Terminal Area
What Currently Exists
In-time (IT) Autonomous 
Safety Assurance
IT Semi-Autonomous Safety 
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TC1: Integrated Risk Assessment for the Terminal Area
TC1’s Research Area
In-time (IT) Autonomous 
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IT Semi-Autonomous Safety 
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AOC Data Integrated Risk Assessment
TC1: Integrated Risk Assessment for the Terminal Area
• Current System
• Risk Assessment done by individual categories
• Any integration of risk is accomplished by humans, based on experience
• Human inability to evaluate all of the data streams
• Future System
• Must be able to receive and analyze multiple streams of heterogeneous data
• Requirement to fuse data
• Requirement to analyze data, identify anomalies and precursors to elevated 
risk
• Must provide an integrated system-level risk assessment
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TC1: Integrated Risk Assessment for the Terminal Area
Integrated risk assessment approach
T-2 hours
(takeoff)
T+5 Hours
(approach & landing)
Pre-flight/in-flightPre-flight
Potential early benefit for AOC/Dispatch
• Integrated risk assessment can provide improved awareness of risks over assessment 
of individual risks 
• In-time horizon = hours 
TC1: Integrated Risk Assessment for the Terminal Area
Integrated risk assessment approach
Potential early benefit for AOC/Dispatch
• Integrated risk assessment can provide improved awareness of risks over assessment 
of individual risks 
• In-time horizon = hours 
Currently identifying top risks 
and appropriate fused data 
streams with AOC partners. NASA building on proven monitoring, 
precursor detection, and analysis capabilities 
to identify and assess hazards and risks in 
the context of partner airlines’ dashboards.
NASA developing new risk integration 
techniques for a better assessment of 
overall safety. In the near term alerts 
and potential mitigation actions are 
given to operators.
TC1: Integrated Risk Assessment for the Terminal Area
• NASA has a proven capability of developing Machine Learning 
algorithms that can identify anomalies in large amounts of data
• There is an industry pull from multiple airline partners to incorporate 
this technology and develop an overall airline safety status.
• This work is a touchpoint for continued engagement with CAST and JIMDAT
• The development of this technology is foundational for the emerging 
market (TC-2 and eTC-6) but also provides an important deliverable to 
our traditional partners.
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TC1: Integrated Risk Assessment for the Terminal Area (Now-FY23)
Progress to Date
We are developing capabilities in advance of final agreements with 
airline partners. 
Toolsuite that finds operationally significant hazards in data is being 
validated and improved through collaboration with ASIAS/MITRE:
• MITRE SME has examined top 40 ‘most anomalous’ events and 
determined 10 were operationally significant.
• These 10 were used to train a classifier, which then found two more 
operationally significant events in the ASIAS data
Capability to fuse aircraft data (e.g. trajectories and weather data) and 
use trees to automatically find precursors is being validated and 
improved using Sherlock/ATM Data Warehouse
• Capability automatically determined which precursors were most 
likely to predict that aircraft would fail to adhere to RNAV, and also 
which precursors would predict strict adherence
Each of these accomplishments are transferrable to 
integrated risk assessment for US Airlines Operation
Centers as soon as the agreements are finalized.
Domain Expert Comments Vis-
Appr
High 
Energ
y
Low
Energ
y
Late 
Config
Poor 
Tech
Low Airspeed and high AOA 5 nm from TD X X
Low Airspeed and high AOA 6 nm from TD. X X
Well above Glideslope at 28 nm from TD becomes 
below GS at 9 nm from TD. X X
Captured Glideslope from above X X
Low Airspeed and high AOA inside 5 nm from TD X X
Fast at 10 nm from Touchdown X X X
High rate of descent 14 nm from TD. X
High Airspeed and intercepts Glideslope 3 nm from TD. X X X
Fast airspeed, too fast to extend flaps 5 nm from TD.  
"…behind the airplane." X X X
Below Glideslope 10 nm from TD X X
In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance
17
TC2: In-Flight Safety 
Predictions for Emerging 
Operations (Now-FY25)
TC1: Integrated Risk 
Assessment for the 
Terminal Area (Now-FY23)
eTC6: Information System 
Architectures and Services to 
Support In-Time Aviation Safety 
Management (FY21-27)
Operational 
Safety for the 
Transformed NAS
Using what we learn in TC1, in addition to work that we’ve already begun with sUAS and UTM, 
we continue to understand the risks and hazards associated with aviation emerging 
operations, and NASA will make recommendations to UAST and the FAA for minimum data 
requirements and standards necessary to monitor, assess, and mitigate for safety. 
TC2: In-Flight Safety Predictions for  Emerging Operations
What Currently Exists
In-time (IT) Autonomous 
Safety Assurance
IT Semi-Autonomous Safety 
Assurance
IT Automated Safety 
Assurance
IT Warnings for Safety 
Assurance
Environment Operational
Level of System/Human Authority & Autonomy
Hazard Sources, Types, 
and Risk/Safety Impacts 
Aviation 
System
NTSB CAST FSF NOTAMsASIASOEMs SMS
Vehicle
Low TRL techs (e.g. 
LiDAR, radar, SLAM)
Limited health 
monitoring
UTM, Geo-
fencing
DAA/SAA, 
ACAS Xu
UAST
TC2: In-Flight Safety Predictions for  Emerging Operations
• Current System
• No overall predictive safety system exists
• UTM research and development has become the de-facto industry standard 
for future system architecture 
• Future System
• Predicted density of sUAS urban operations require a robust ability to 
understand system safety
• TC-2 is the first demonstration of an ISSA capability in an urban sUAS
environment
• Using UTM architecture allows insight into requirements for UTM inspired ATM
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TC2: In-Flight Safety Predictions for  Emerging Operations
TC2’s Research Space
In-time (IT) Autonomous 
Safety Assurance
IT Semi-Autonomous Safety 
Assurance
IT Automated Safety 
Assurance
IT Warnings for Safety 
Assurance
Environment Operational
Level of System/Human Authority & Autonomy
Hazard Sources, Types, 
and Risk/Safety Impacts 
Aviation 
System
NTSB CAST FSF NOTAMsASIASOEMs SMS
Vehicle
UTM, Geo-
fencing
DAA/SAA, 
ACAS Xu
UAST
ISSA sUAS Urban Ops
TC2: In-Flight Safety Predictions for  Emerging Operations
• NASA’s previous and current research positions it well to participate in this 
work.
• Foundational work in data fusion and analysis TC-1
• UTM research & development
• Role in UAST
• Direction of future ARMD portfolio
• Developing partnerships allow NASA to leverage and deploy its work
• USGS
• Nuro
• Google Loon
• Bell Helicopter
• Others?
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TC2: In-Flight Safety Predictions for  Emerging Operations
Technical Approach
Potential early benefit for AOC/Dispatch
• Integrated risk assessment can provide improved awareness of risks over assessment 
of individual risks 
• In-time horizon = hours 
Monitor: Identify top hazards 
and risks for emerging 
operations. Initial work nearly 
complete. Next year effort 
includes outreach and 
partnership with emerging 
U.S. operators.
NASA has built out a framework for the big 
data management and has demonstrated 
proof-of-concept for in-time risk assessment 
with UTM TCL4.  Near-term effort expands 
that effort to direct work with partners.
NASA has begun identifying which risks 
can be automatically mitigated and which 
require manual intervention. This will 
form part of our basis for 
recommendations in FY25.
TC2 Progress Summary
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Uncertainty management framework (in Thrust 5 Roadmap and 
NRC Thrust 5 report) is complete. Will be published in Aviation 
2019 and other venues.
Three initial safety service prototypes developed: battery metric, 
proximity metric, casualty risk metric.
• Demonstrated as part of TCL4.
• Also will be integrated into ATM-X Testbed for simulations and 
GC.
Demonstrations will validate the data and information 
requirements due this year.  (API 19-4)
GCS
ISSA/EO functions
Motivation and Objective
ISSA/EO promotes data-driven predictive capabilities that (1) enable 
timely mitigation of safety risks; and (2) consider the complex 
interplay of many factors that are difficult to measure or track. 
Predictive capabilities can be misleading if their limitations are not 
well understood and accounted for.
Milestone SWS.EO-1.3 (falls directly from the Thrust 5 roadmap):
• Develop a framework for uncertainty management
• Exit criteria – Describe a method for encapsulating uncertainty 
from sources used to estimate, track, and predict safety/risks; 
Method includes approaches to uncertainty representation, 
characterization, and assessment of propagation of effects
TC2: Uncertainty Management Framework
Contributors: Corbetta, Banerjee, Okolo, Gorospe, and Luchinsky (NASA ARC)
Approach
• Accommodate both Bayesian and non-Bayesian methodologies
• Consider propagation through ISSA/EO functional elements
• Consider source types (models, measurements, input, etc.)
• Trajectory prediction function used as exemplar test case
• Simulation and flight data used to confirm framework validity
• (Next step) Apply to other ISSA/EO predictive functions and refine
Accomplishment
• Achieves milestone SWS.EO-1.3 (Q2/FY19)
• Becomes basis to develop/evaluate all ISSA predictive functions
• Helps to establish information requirements (API AR-4, Q4/FY19)
• Helps to ID uncertainty sources & effects on safety metric estimates
• All documentation, incl. sim and flight test data archived internally
• Publication: “Real-time UAV trajectory prediction for safety 
monitoring in low-altitude airspace” AIAA AVIATION, 06-2019
(3 others submitted or planned)
(ISSA/EO – In-time System-wide Safety Assurance for Emerging Operations)
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Motivation and Objective
In line with the ISSA/EO (TC-2) research agenda, to carry out 
extensive set of simulations that encompass coordinated tracking of 
safety metrics, we participated in a number of “Sprint” activities held 
by the UTM project in preparation for the TCL4 flight 
demonstrations. 
SWS TC2 researchers engaged in both “Sprint 3” and “Sprint 4” 
activities in the NASA Ames Airspace Operations Lab (AOL) with the 
objective of proving out UTM integration and testing the SWS SDSP 
(Supplemental Data Service Provider) interface.
TC2: UTM TCL4 Engagement with Airspace Operations Lab (AOL) 
Simulations
Approach & Accomplishments
• Integration leading up to both Sprint activities included:
• Participation by AOL researchers to enable integration of systems      
and development of AOL simulation tools
• Developed simulation data for a region of airspace in Langley, 
Virginia.
• Development of backend SWS processes to handle simulation 
requests. Debug and test of interaction through the REST interface.
• Collaboration with UTM and AOL researchers for participation in 
planned activities during Sprint3 and Sprint4 tests
• GUI interface design and development for display of in-time safety 
metric responses
(ISSA/EO – In-time System-wide Safety Assurance for Emerging Operations)
SWS/UTM/AOL Real-time Integration 
Impacts
• Achieves milestone SWS.EO-2.2: 2nd-gen capability simulation and/or flight tests 
(initial safety margin tracking)
• Executed the simulated flight path in concert with other Sprint3/Sprint4 
participants 
• Proved data collection and safety metric calculation by the SWS SDSP
• Presented the in-time safety metric outputs to the user in the AOL lab
• Internal Report: “UTM Sprint 3 Participation – SWS TC2 SDSP” and 
“UTM Sprint 4 Participation – SWS TC2 SDSP”
Next Steps
• Joint flight testing at Langley; TC2 analysis of TCL4 flight data from 
participants.
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Objective
Annual Performance Indicator (API AR 19-4) (Sep 30, 2019):
“Identify data architecture and information requirements (i.e., 
content and quality) for in-time monitoring of selected operational 
risks for small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)”
• Identification of three safety risks and the data requirements for 
monitoring those risks, demonstrating how risk can be identified 
using the available data (To achieve GREEN Rating).
TC2: Architecture and Information Requirements
Approach
: Architecture – Presume UTM ecosystem; Identify how ISSA 
functions can overlay (e.g. ‘Supplemental Data Services’)
:  Information requirements – Consider content, quality, and 
exchange; Use existing standards where able and as guide; 
Assume monitoring for 5 high priority safety risks
:  Validation – Use simulation and flight testing to (1) confirm 
architecture support, and (2) expose previously-unknown info 
req’ts (e.g. incl. 3 safety risk services within UTM SDSP construct); 
partner to leverage/access larger data sets
:  Documentation – Baseline (FY19), Revisions (FY20+), Informing 
FAA/industry standards (e.g. via RTCA, UAST, RTT(s))
(ISSA/EO – In-time System-wide Safety Assurance for Emerging Operations)
Progress
: Status – On schedule
: Architecture & functions defined
: Sims completed (w UTM Sprints)
: Gen-1 flight tests completed 
(Dec); Gen-2 underway*
: Initial evaluation of 3 ‘services’
: Data collected to advance others
: Info reqm’ts doc drafted to 
organize as ‘all in one place’
GCS
ISSA/EO functions
Next Steps
• Aligning with UAM Domain 
(via ATM-X collaboration)
• RTCA request for info on 
UAM/sUAS data needs
• Inputs to UAST Data WG 
Action Plans
• DHS/DoT Phase 2 (APNT)
• Nuro and NASCTNC (future)
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Motivation and Objective
ARMD’s FY 2021 Program and Resources Guidance states:
“AOSP shall assess rebalancing the SWS investments to accelerate 
work and better support the UAM and GC.  In addition to 
rebalancing, AOSP should determine whether any additional budget 
may be required.”
• The ISSA/EO (TC-2) research agenda has been adjusted to 
accelerate the planned FY20 UAM Decision Point (MS SWS.EO.1.7); 
and to begin integration immediately of the most mature and 
relevant elements of the ISSA/EO system concept within the 
developing ATM-X/GC environment.
TC2: ATM-X/UAM Integration
Approach
• Work to accelerate & integrate 3 ‘SWS services’ (initially) (X2 sim)
• Battery prognostics; Proximity metric; Casualty risk metric*
• Collect UAM vehicle-specific and other data needed to (a) demo 
existing services in this domain, (b) advance other ISSA/EO services 
or functions, and (c) expose any new/unique requirements
• Assume ISSA/EO functions that reside within Ground Control 
Station or Vehicle must be tested as prev planned, or in GC2, 3, …
• Interaction with UAM community and stakeholders will allow 
adjustments to R&D scope and priorities moving to GC2, 3, …
Integration Architecture
and Scenarios (X2 sim)
• Draft approach below
• Testing, Aug-Sep, 2019
(ISSA/EO – In-time System-wide Safety Assurance for Emerging Operations)
Risk: Inter-project dependencies? (Sched, resources, etc)
*Originated within UTM project; co-developed since SWS start-up
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TestbedNUSS (AWS)
UTM TCL4 System
Airspace Simulation 
Platform (MACS)
NASA Provided 
Scheduling 
Services 
Positions
Operations
UVR
Supplemental Data 
Service Provider
Data Node API 
Sandbox (Grid 
Discovery) 
Ground Control 
StationIndustry USS
Operations
Positions
States
Flight Plan to TBOV 
Service
AWS 
Gateway
NASA Provided 
“SWS” Services
NASA Provided 
Research GCS
 rovided 
cheduling 
ervices
NASA Provided 
CD&R Services
NASA Provided 
Autonomous 
Contingency 
Management
NASA Provided 
Flight Planning 
Services
System Wide Safety
In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance
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TC2: In-Flight Safety 
Predictions for Emerging 
Operations (Now-FY25)
TC1: Integrated Risk 
Assessment for the 
Terminal Area (Now-FY23)
eTC6: Information System 
Architectures and Services to 
Support In-Time Aviation Safety 
Management (FY21-27)
Operational 
Safety for the 
Transformed NAS
Work with emerging U.S. industry partners and regulators to understand and recommend 
requirements and standards for an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) as 
recommended by the NRC Thrust 5 committee. Work between now and FY21 will identify 
gaps not currently being filled by our industry and regulatory partners. 
Executive Summary
eTC6: Information System Architectures and Services to Support 
In-Time Aviation Safety Management (IASMS)
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Why This Work is Prioritized
The scale, heterogeneity, and types of operations performed for UAM will require a In-Time Aviation Safety 
Management System (IASMS) that is more proactive and predictive than our current-day SMS (Safety 
Management System). As suggested by the NRC above, this work is required for UAM.
Challenge Objective: Define and demonstrate an information architecture and data-sharing approach to a Safety Management 
System for UAM-like airspace  
Motivation
“The range of capabilities that can be successfully implemented in an [ISSA] concept will be limited if available data are inadequate 
in terms of completeness, quality, consistency, the ability to fuse them in the time scales of interest, the ability to store them for 
future use, and the relative cost and value of obtaining additional and/or higher quality data.” “This project is urgent because it is 
fundamental to the success of an IASMS and because some components will likely take years to complete.” NRC Report 
Focus
SWS TC1 does foundational work demonstrating the benefit of an ISSA-like system in the current and very near-term airspace.  
SWS TC2 provided insight into data integrity and quality requirements for the earliest emerging markets. eTC6 uses the TC1 and 
TC2 work to address the larger scope of the NRC-requested IASMS.
The increased density and heterogeneity of vehicles and operations that will be brought about by AAM and UTM require a proactive
consideration of risk as the system is built as opposed to a the historical reactionary approach. To fully understand tomorrow’s risks, 
it is necessary to drive the safety data requirements up front.
Future Design Time Safety
Supports the 2025-2035 Thrust 6 Vision: ‘Introduction of aviation 
systems with flexible autonomy based on earned levels of trust, capable 
of carrying out mission-level goals.’
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Barriers to Future Design Time Safety
• Increased variety and scale of operations means that people can no longer be the 
safety gatekeepers, or the people will be the bottleneck 
• Our current assurance processes assume that all decision-making (non-determinism) 
happens during operations, by people
• People are licensed and trusted, hardware and software are completely exercised for assurance
• Determinism in the hardware and software allows us to exercise them using testing
• Recent aerospace systems, while deterministic, are complex enough that testing-based assurance 
has been costly
• Changes made to components within the system have impacts throughout the system (emergent 
behaviors)
• There are also social barriers to achieving NASA’s vision – NASA can educate and 
inform for these barriers but will not directly address:
• New entrants often underestimate society’s tolerance for risk
• Trust in automation and autonomy (We partially address this in technical challenge 4)
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Design-Time Safety Technical Challenges
• NASA has chosen two technical challenges:
• V&V for Commercial Operations
• Addresses cost barrier to implementing new aerospace systems in current regulatory framework by 
automating the collection of evidence and the creation of safety arguments
• NASA has already built and released tools that are being used by industry partners 
• All that remains for this technical challenge is the collection of overall impact on assurance resources 
(time/cost) by industry – complete by FY22
• Complex Autonomous Systems Assurance
• Increased levels of autonomy will happen with small UAS first because of mission risk profiles, 
increased autonomy will eventually need to be a part of UAM or the large-scale business case won’t 
close (not enough trained operators for demand).
• Many emerging entrants do not realize that our current level of aviation safety is due to forensic 
analysis, and that accidents can kill an emerging market. NASA is a trusted intermediary between 
industry and the regulators.
• NASA is a leader on the assurance of autonomy and is asked for help regularly by industry and by other 
government agencies
• Other technical challenges were considered, and are available in backup slides
• The assurance of autonomy and of complex systems has been repeatedly 
addressed by National Academies and expert committees for the DoD
32
Design Time Safety Assurance
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TC4: Validation & Verification 
for Emerging Ops (Now-FY24)
TC3: Validation & 
Verification for Commercial 
Ops (Now-FY22)
eTC5: Flexible Assurance for 
Systems-of-Systems Technologies 
(FY20-26)
Design Safety 
for a Transformed 
NAS
TC3 completes work NASA has done on lowering the cost and time of certification while 
maintaining safety. We are now using NASA-developed tools and techniques to measure the 
impact of the tools over the current manual processes.
TC3: V&V for Commercial Ops (Now ends FY22)
Addressing the cost barrier
The primary cost drivers for the current 
assurance process are defect escapes 
and rework.
Industry TIMs over the last 5 years have 
identified System Requirements as the 
part of the life cycle in which NASA 
could have the most impact.
Source: Peter Feiler. ‘Supporting the ARP4761 Safety 
Assessment Process with AADL. Feb 6, 2014. 
https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/aadl/images/1/13/ERTSEMV
2-Feb2014.pdf 
70% of faults introduced
3.5% faults are found
1x cost to remove
10% of faults introduced
59.5% faults are found
20-80x cost to remove
20% of faults introduced
16% faults are found
5x cost to remove
20.5% faults are found
300-1000x cost to remove
TC3: V&V for Commercial Ops (Now ends FY22)
NASA-Developed Capabilities
Library of Mathematical Proofs to Validate 
Requirements – used for RTCA committees for 
compact position reporting (fixed 500 nautical-
mile error in requirements) and to determine 
detect-and-avoid requirements 
Tools to validate and auto-generate 
safety evidence from high-level design 
models – in the process of transfer to 
UTRC
Tools to automatically analyze code for run-
time errors – available and being used by 
UTRC, Boeing, Collins, FAA tech center and 
many others
Tool to Automatically  Analyze Requirements 
& Auto-generate Tests – currently in the 
process of being released 
Approach: Automated tools developed by NASA are already being used by our industry and regulatory partners. Measure 
quantifiable impact of these capabilities through a combination of in-house (FAA partnership) and NRA partner 
assessments (proposals due July 2019).  The NRA solicitation will be likely awarded in early FY 2020.  We have already 
delivered draft documentation to the FAA for a new certification framework that may improve the end-to-end 
certification time.
TC3: V&V for Commercial Ops (Now ends FY22)
Impacts and Strategy – Heilmeyer Summary
Objective: Reduce the time required to 
certify state-of-the-art avionics capabilities 
for commercial transport.
Current state:  
• The cost of validating, verifying, and 
certifying modern avionics systems is a 
barrier to deploying new systems.
New state in FY 20:  
• Automated techniques reduce 
time for validation and 
verification evidence collection 
by 10-50% depending on the 
type of system.
• These techniques have been 
validated by industry partners 
and tools are released to and 
used by U.S. industry.
• A prototype for a new 
certification framework under 
consideration by the FAA.
Transformed NAS Enabling 
Capabilities for Design-Time 
Safety: 
• Time to certification 
significantly reduced for 
both traditional and 
emerging markets
• Savings allow confidence 
from investors and greater 
competitiveness in emerging 
vehicle market 
TC3 Technical & Programmatic Progress Summary
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There is an FAA-coordinated Overarching Properties Working Group to evaluate the benefit of and create a path forward 
for the NASA-developed Overarching Properties (OP).
First release of the Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET).  Approximately 40% of all defects are created in the 
requirements phase (where they are the hardest to fix).  The NASA-developed FRET tool provides a user-intuitive way for 
engineers to create correct requirements and the tests and monitors to assure those requirements.
Motivation and Objective
Requirements engineering is a central step in the development of safety-
critical systems. FRET supports a restricted natural language that enables 
the intuitive expression of requirements, while ensuring unambiguous 
semantics. The language is associated with formal semantics thus 
allowing the connection to formal analysis tools. FRET provides its users 
with explanations of the formal semantics in various forms: natural 
language, diagrams, interactive simulation. FRET is currently connected 
to the nuXMV and Cocosim analyzers for consistency analysis and 
verification of Simulink models, respectively. 
Milestone SWS.SAAFE-2.2:
• Demonstrate requirement formalization analysis and consistency
TC3: Demonstrate requirement formalization
Contributors: Giannakopoulou, Mavridou, Pressburger, Shi, Schumann (NASA ARC)
Approach
• Extensible grammar defines the language of FRET; requirements made up 
of fields for scope, conditions, component, timing, and responses. 
• Compositional generation of semantics from requirement fields; 
semantics in future and past time metric temporal logic
• Options for understanding semantics, including interactive simulation
• Provide support for connecting requirement variables to model signals
• Extensive testing of semantics
(Next) Apply to missions; provide FRET support for correcting requirements
Accomplishment
• Supports milestone SWS.SAAFE-2.2 (Q2/FY19)
• First release of tool features intuitive user interface, semantics generation, 
interactive simulation, connection to analysis tools, requirements 
organization in databases, user manual  
• Downloaded by on-site users; applied to formalize requirements 
provided by: Lockheed Martin, Biosentinel, AVA, Boeing 
• Three papers – 1 submitted, 2 to be submitted in the next month
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TC4: Validation & Verification 
for Emerging Ops (Now-FY24)
TC3: Validation & 
Verification for Commercial 
Ops (Now-FY22)
eTC5: Flexible Assurance for 
Systems-of-Systems Technologies 
(FY20-26)
Design Safety 
for a Transformed 
NAS
TC4 will deliver recommendations to industry standards committees and to the regulators on 
the inclusion of machine-learning enabled components in highly-assured systems.
TC4: Complex Autonomous Systems Assurance (Now-FY24)
How We Assure Aerospace Systems Today
TC4: Complex Autonomous Systems Assurance (Now-FY24)
How We Assure Aerospace Systems Today
TC4: Complex Autonomous Systems Assurance (Now-FY24)
Keys to Assuring Aerospace Systems Today
• We certify systems
(machinery, hardware, 
software) in context of 
the mission. 
• Systems designed to be 
deterministic. 
• After design, all
decision-making is only 
part of operations.
We license operators by
• Establishing processes
• Training, 
• Testing, and 
• Monitoring
TC4: Complex Autonomous Systems Assurance (Now-FY24)
How to Assure Decision-Making at Design
Steps:
1. Choose machine-learning 
enabled components that can 
be bounded or tested.
2. Create a monitor that can be 
rigorously assured.
3. Certify the system in the context 
of the monitor and a failover 
plan/process (less robust).
PLAN:
Incorporate the 
processes & 
methods we use 
during operations 
into design.
We license operators by
• Establishing processes
• Training, 
• Testing, and 
• Monitoring
• We certify systems
(machinery, hardware, 
software) in context of 
the mission. 
• Systems designed to be 
deterministic. 
• After design, all
decision-making is only 
part of operations.
TC4: Complex Autonomous Systems Assurance (Now-FY24)
Plan for Assuring Decision-Making Systems at Design
Details:
1. SWS has categorized aerospace MLEC according to their likelihood 
of assurance (how easy to bound and/or test).  SWS also released 
an NRA for additional validation from academia & industry 
(proposals due July 2019).
2. SWS has examples of these kinds of monitors including 
SAFEGUARD.  We want to improve them by including graceful 
degradation. Additionally, we have SAA with Boeing and GE to 
work with them on their monitors.
3. SWS has work on specialized safety cases and Overarching 
Properties that would give emerging operations paths for the 
certification of machine-learning enabled components.
TC4: Complex Autonomous Systems Assurance (Now-FY24)
Impacts and Strategy – Heilmeyer Summary
Objective: Develop a prototype certification 
process for autonomous aerospace systems 
that will be NASA’s recommendation to the 
FAA, UAST, the Flight Safety Foundation and 
other standards committees. 
Current state: 
• Assurance of autonomous systems can’t 
be accomplished in the framework of 
our current process. 
• Certification depends upon a full 
exercise of possible behaviors, and 
• The set of possible behaviors for 
autonomous systems is too large.
New state in FY 24:  NASA will 
deliver a recommendation for the 
assurance of some machine-
learning-enabled components 
within an overall autonomous 
systems architecture. This 
recommendation will include a 
process by which you can collect 
evidence for target levels of 
safety and risk.
Approach: Build on NASA’s leadership in assurance of autonomy (help and partnership requested by 
DARPA, AFRL, NIST, Johns Hopkins, Boeing, Nuro, etc.). Continue collaboration with academia and OGA on 
the analysis of machine-learning algorithm behaviors.  Direct NASA’s expertise on runtime monitoring and 
safety cases towards the bounding of autonomy and the assurance of contingency plans.
Transformed NAS Enabling 
Capabilities for Design-Time 
Safety: 
• Characterization of ML 
algorithm behaviors
• Bounding of ‘safe’ 
behaviors for some ML 
algorithms
• Assurance of monitors 
and safety-cases with 
failover plans
TC4 Partnership Progress
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New agreements for the assurance of autonomy with AFRL, Boeing, and GE are complete.
DARPA has asked NASA to attend and act as an expert reviewer for its Assured Autonomy 
program.
New agreement with Nuro (autonomous car company operating in 4 cities) nearing 
completion. Continuing discussions with Google Loon and Wing.
NRA released 5/1 for industry and academic partners to help with autonomous systems 
assurance.  Proposals are due mid-June.
TC4 Technical Progress Summary
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• Completed milestone on the review of currently-used machine-learning algorithms and 
their assurability.
• One draft document on the OP delivered to the FAA September 2018.  Another NASA TM 
in review now.
• Each of the following capabilities will feed into an overall assurance argument for the use 
of autonomous decision-making components within a safety-critical system:
• Completed milestone on capability to explain machine-learning enabled components 
(including deep-learning neural networks).
• Completed milestone on capability to ensure that machine-learning and 
optimization algorithms as implemented in code are provably correct.
Motivation and Objective
As autonomy becomes more complex, it also becomes more 
unpredictable, especially with the addition of machine learning. We 
seek to mitigate these issues with: 1) Explainable AI - explain decisions 
made by “black box” AI, 2) Justifiable trust in AI performance – verify 
that the AI system is performing as well as advertised
Milestone SWS.CASA-3.2:
• Develop and demonstrate basic capabilities for explanation of results 
produced by autonomy algorithms
• Exit criteria – Describe methods for explaining AI based control systems 
and for justifiable trust in AI performance. Methods include attribution 
analysis, rule conversion, distance metric analysis and transfer learning 
analysis.
TC4: Explainability for Autonomy Algorithms
Contributors: Agogino, Giannakopoulou, Lee (NASA ARC)
Approach
• Convert black box system into explainable system including Bayesian 
rule lists, explainable trees and explanation templates
• Re-engineer black box system (e.g. replace top of deep neural net) to 
help analyze relation between decisions and training data.
• Analyze robustness of performance and confidence ratings on tests 
from original data distribution and transfers to new data distribution.
Accomplishment
• Contributes to milestone SWS.CASA-3.2 (6/30/2019)
• Converted neural network control system to Bayesian Rule Lists, 
Grammar-based decision trees and Explanation templates
• Performed sensitivity analysis based on integrated gradients, and 
time-extended LSTMs to black box system.
• Created nearest-neighbor based explanation system allowing 
decisions from deep neural network to be traced back 
to training data.
• Publication (in review): “Challenges of Explaining Real-Time Planning,” 
ICAPS, July 2019
if conflict to left
go up with probability .19
else if conflicts are above
go left with probability .87
else 
go up with probability .07
…
...
...
Motivation and Objective
Safety of autonomous operations depends on numerically intensive 
algorithms for problems such as geo-spatial containment, weather 
avoidance, and aircraft separation.  This category of algorithms has 
potential for incorrect safety-critical decisions resulting from floating-
point  round-off errors.
The objective is to develop a capability to ensure that floating-point 
implementations make the same correct critical decisions as 
algorithms formally verified assuming infinitely precise computations 
on real numbers
TC4: Mitigation of Numerical Errors
POC: Cesar Munoz
Approach
• Combine capabilities of three formal analysis tools to create a new 
capability to ensure that a C implementation of a formally specified 
algorithm implements the same critical decisions.  The process is to 
automatically transform a verified real-number specification of an 
algorithm to a generated software implementation with proven 
verification conditions.
• Building Blocks:
• Algorithms verified using PVS theorem proving systems 
(https://github.com/nasa/PolyCARP)
• PRECiSA static analysis tool (https://github.com/nasa/PRECiSA), and 
• FRAMA-C static analyzer (https://frama-c.com/)
Accomplishment
• Developed and demonstrated capability to find and correct 
critical software defects introduced by floating-point 
roundoff error 
• Completion of milestone CASA 5.1
• Provably Correct Floating-Point Implementation of a Point-in-Polygon 
Algorithm, by Moscato, Titolo, Feliu, and Munoz; to appear in 
FM2019: 3rd World Congress on Formal Methods, October 2019
(Emerging Operations Design Assurance/Addressing Residual Risk in Autonomous Systems)
Example points of potential incorrect decisions
Motivation and Objective
Current assurance of software-intensive systems for commercial 
aviation relies on a collection of industry-consensus standards such 
as RTCA DO-178C, SAE ARP 4754A, and ARP 4761.  There are 
increasing concerns that these standards may not be sufficient for 
anticipated future systems.
The objective is to develop a technology-independent approach to 
enable effective assurance and approval for both current and future 
software-intensive aerospace systems
TC4: Overarching Properties
POC: Michael Holloway
Approach
• Collaboration with FAA and Industry (initiated under IA1-1407 
Annex 7 Streamlining Assurance Processes; new agreement 
pending)-- develop and validate Overarching Properties (OP)
• Develop sequence of increasingly complex worked examples to 
provide guidance
• Assess whether OP provide a viable alternative to DO-178C and 
related guidance documents
• Continue in a leading role in the FAA-coordinated Overarching 
Properties Working Group 
Accomplishment
• Completed milestone SAAFE 7.1 – Develop and deliver draft 
guidance for demonstrating justifiable confidence in safety 
claims based on showing satisfaction of Overarching Properties 
(crawl)
• 2018 September: Delivered draft document to FAA -- Understanding 
Overarching Properties: First Steps, (author: C. Michael Holloway)
• Developed draft NASA TM Retrospectively Documenting Satisfaction
of the Overarching Properties: An Exploratory Prototype, by 
Mallory S. Graydon and Jared D. Cronin (in review)
• Significant contributions and presentations to 
Overarching Properties Working Group
(Commercial Operations Design Assurance/Streamlining Assurance)
Overarching Properties (as of 2019-04-11)
Intent: The defined intended behavior is correct and complete 
with respect to the desired behavior.
Correctness: The implementation is correct with respect to the 
defined intended behavior, under foreseeable operating 
conditions.
Innocuity : Any part of the implementation that is not required by 
the defined intended behavior has no unacceptable safety impact.
50
Design Time Safety Assurance
51
TC4: Validation & Verification 
for Emerging Ops (Now-FY24)
TC3: Validation & 
Verification for Commercial 
Ops (Now-FY22)
eTC5: Flexible Assurance for 
Systems-of-Systems Technologies 
(FY20-26)
Design Safety 
for a Transformed 
NAS
eTC5 is under development now.  Our plan is to work with other government agencies (USGS, 
AFRL) to develop challenges that let us understand better the gaps we have for rapid, flexible 
assurance of interacting systems.
Executive Summary
eTC5: Flexible Assurance for Systems-of-Systems Technologies (FASST)
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Why This Work is Prioritized
Achieving UAM at scale within the short time-frame predicted while maintaining acceptable societal 
risk will require minimum design re-work, especially if the U.S. is to maintain a competitive advantage.
Challenge Objective: Develop, demonstrate and validate a process that allows us to assure system-level safety in a 
future aerospace system with heterogeneous and rapidly-changing decision-making components (vehicles, third-
party service providers, etc.).
Focus
• Highly interconnected and heterogeneous systems, such as those enabled by UTM, are prone to emergent 
behaviors and to exploitation by selfish participants.
• Current system safety assurance assumes rational and cooperative behavior. However, as the cost for entry into 
the aviation market goes down, we need additional safeguards for decision-making that is either incompetent or 
adversarial, or to detect behavior that is rational at the vehicle level, but harmful at the airspace system level.
Backup
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Thrust 5  - NASA’s Vision for Operational Safety to 2045
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*Risks here refers to safety-related risks; which may be mitigated during operations or during design.
Domain Specific (In-time) Safety Monitoring and Altering Tools (2015-2025)
Expanded system awareness through increased access to safety relevant data and initial integration of 
analysis capabilities; improved safety through initial real-time detection and alerting of hazards at the 
domain level and decision support for limited, simple operations.
Integrated Predictive Technologies with Domain Level Application (2025-2035)
NAS-wide availability of more fully integrated in-time detection and alerting for enhanced risk assessment 
and support of initial assured human and machine decision support for mitigation response selection for 
more complex operations.
Adaptive Real-time Safety Threat Management (2035-2045)
Fully integrated threat detection and assessment that support trusted methods for dynamic, 
multi-agent planning, evaluation, and execution of in-time risk mitigating response to hazardous events.
System-Wide Safety and Thrust 5
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Risk Identification
Thrust 5:
• Observe
• Assess
• Mitigate
Design
Mitigation
This loop:
months to years
years to decades
Verification & Validation of Flight Critical 
Systems
In-time System-wide Safety
Operational
Mitigation
This loop:
Seconds to hours
Hours to days
Su
b-
Pr
oj
ec
ts
TC2: In-Flight Safety Predictions for  Emerging Operations
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Challenge Objective: Demonstrate a data-driven safety assurance capability that provides a timely assessment, prediction, and mitigation of 
safety risks for UAS urban operations. 
Focus
• TC2 focuses on demonstration of the Thrust 5 In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) capability as applied to safety-critical risks for 
low-altitude urban UAS operations. Planned demonstration within UTM TCL4 this year. TC2 was already well-aligned with UAM.
• Changed the TC2 technical plan to direct future TC2 work from UAS towards UAM with sUAS used as a surrogate when larger passenger- or 
cargo-carrying vehicles cannot be used for assessment or demonstration.
• FY20-FY22 efforts contain:
• An RFP for emerging operations partnerships.
• Data-driven safety assessments with UAST, and academia.
• Models and metrics to characterize safe operations, and assurance tools for predictive system components.
• System evaluations.
• This work as planned is already well-aligned with UAM. FY19 augmentation is directed toward integrating the ISSA capability into ATM-X to 
accelerate incorporation into Grand Challenge demonstration. This work will continue into FY20
• FY21 and 22 resources are shifted to TC6 for development of the In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) as called for in the 
NRC Thrust 5 report.
Why This Work is Prioritized
UAM operations are significantly different from standard operations in ways that will make our current operational safety procedures 
and processes obsolete. Maintaining and/or improving safety in this new operational paradigm will require stronger proactive and
novel predictive capabilities. Continuing with current operational safety processes and procedures will delay the growth of the 
market. Eliminating current operational safety processes and procedures with no replacement carries unacceptable societal risk.
SWS Overview
Objectives
TC2 (Emerging Ops) Overview
ISSA –TC2 Domain Space & Research Scope
ISSA TC-2
Emerging Ops
UTM, 
Geo-
fencing
Not driven by a Target Level 
of Safety (TLS), or standards 
for assurance provision
UAST
DAA/SAA, 
ACAS Xu Low TRL techs (e.g. 
LiDAR, radar, SLAM)
Limited health 
monitoring
Urban BVLOS sUAS (Phase 1)
UAM (Phase 2)
Environment
Operational
Real-time (RT) Autonomous 
Safety Assurance
RT Semi-Autonomous 
Safety Assurance
RT Automated 
Safety Assurance
RT Warnings for 
Safety Assurance
Aeronautics and Aviation
Application Domain
Vehicle
Aviation 
System
**(Here LOC is outside the envelope or flight control system failure)
TC2 Statement: Develop and demonstrate a data-driven capability to 
assess, predict, and mitigate risks during highly-autonomous urban 
flight operations.
Key Attributes:
Initially targets 5 safety risks identified by UTM and others*:
1) flight outside of approved airspace
2) unsafe proximity to people or property
3) critical system failure (loss of link, loss or degraded GPS, loss of 
power, engine failure)
4) loss-of-control**
5) cyber-security related risks
Assumes air traffic risks addressed by others (UTM, UAS in NAS, ATM-X)
2 Phases to align w ARMD guidance
Key Collaborators:
• UTM/ATM-X regarding ISSA info services and models to mitigate 
targeted risks; and for data collection/test opportunities
• UAS operators and manufacturers regarding automated 
mitigations, joint demos, and tech transfer paths
• UAST for alignment with identified risks and transferring findings 
and Safety Enhancements to FAA/industry
*(e.g. UAST, JARUS, ASTM)
ISSA TC2 Progress
Develop Baseline Testing Capability
Milestone: Baseline capability testing
Objectives:
(1)Test and evaluate baseline architecture and selected 
functional elements
(2)Collect data to support future development of envisioned 
capabilities
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Other Drivers:
• Confirm consistency and interaction with UTM infrastructure
• Integrate relevant recent research
• Begin spiral RDT&E process
• Requirements discovery
Ground Infrastructure and Information Services
(within UTM ecosystem)
Onboard 
System
Ground Control Station
Use Case 
Missions
Within CERTAIN Test Range
Re
po
rt
in
g 
sy
st
em
s
ISSA TC2 Progress
Establish EO Functions and Reference Architecture
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Model-based predictive capabilities
Aircraft state and aerodynamic model
Positioning system performance model (e.g. GPS)
Comm/RFI performance model
Population density and model
Vehicle system health and model (e.g. battery, eng)
AIS/MET* (e.g. SUA/TFR; Wx; GIS features)
ISSA 
functions
Monitor
Assess
Mitigate
Safety metrics 
and margins
*TC-2 R&D assumes that some AIS/MET services already 
exist, or are in development by others
**TC-2 R&D assumes air traffic-related services are 
addressed by others (e.g. UTM, ACAS-XU) (but TC2 construct 
must be consistent with these solutions and interoperable) 
Air traffic**
Re
po
rt
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g 
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s
Relevant data 
to info service 
systems
Functions may be onboard, at GCS, and/or at SDSP
SDS-1
Supplemental Data 
Services (SDSs)
SDS-2
SDS-3
SDS-4
SDS-5
SDS-6
SDS-X GCS
SDS-S
Safety/risk monitoring
“Mature” SWS Services
Non-Participant Casualty Risk Assessment
Intended function: Estimate, track, and predict 
risk of impacting populated areas in the event of 
critical system failure or loss-of-control; Can be 
executed pre-flight using flight plan or in-flight 
on cFS
Outputs: Casualty and LOC probabilities, 
Likelihood & Severity values, Recommended 
course of action (abort, land, RTL, continue)
Inputs: (see next chart)
Recent testing: UTM TCL-3/4 sim and flight tests 
(2018, 2019)
Battery Prognostics
Intended function: Estimate, track, and 
predict state-of-charge and remaining useful 
life of onboard power source(s)
Outputs: Estimated time when end of 
discharge (EOD) will be reached (or est. 
remaining flight time); Probability of reaching 
EOD before end of mission
Inputs: (see next chart)
Recent testing: UTM TCL-4 Sprint sims 
(2019); SWS flights (2018, 2019)
Proximity to Obstacles*
Intended function: Estimate, track, and 
predict proximity (time and distance) to fixed 
vertical structures near the flight path
Outputs: Portions of vehicle trajectory that 
violate proximity thresholds (incl. start/end 
pts); Nearest approach point; Distance to 
nearest approach point; Severity of violation 
(see note)
Inputs: (see next chart)
Recent testing: UTM TCL-4 Sprint sims 
(2019); SWS flights (2018)
Future plan (under SWS): Advancing TRL and refining requirements through series of test/evaluate cycles,
1) Integration across metric trackers for aggregate safety anomaly, trend, and precursor detection capabilities
2) On-board real-time versions for tactical assessment and input to auto-contingency selection and execution functions
3) Application of assurance methods for safety-critical elements
*1st step toward a more general service/function:
“Proximity to Loss of Safety Margin”
Input Data Requirements
Info type Source NPCRA BP PtO Comment
Configuration settings SWS X X X SWS researchers will provide config files
Aircraft specifications ? X X X Size, weight, model, #rotors/engine, etc. (Can be via GUI)
Aerodynamic model ? X X X Level-of-detail TBD (e.g. aero coefficients)
Flight plan Testbed? X X X 4D preferred (can be Mission Planner waypoint file)
Battery model ? X Calibration procedure req’d (re-cal after 8-10 flights)
3D geo-feature database Testbed? X X Buildings/obstacles (GIS model preferred)
Population density database SWS X X Stored at the server; 3rd party vendor; 2-3 wks lead time
Wind vector or model Testbed? X X If a static vector, can be input as part of config settings
USS/Testbed/SWIM info - - - SWS would like to log this to support its future work
Info type NPCRA BP PtO Comment
Aircraft state (position, velocity, etc) X X X
Battery state (voltage, current, temp, …) X X For each on-board battery pack
Engine/motor state (current, temp, …) X
A/P state (auto, manual, land, RTL, etc) X
Nav system state (e.g. GPS SVs, DOPs, etc) X
Comm system state (e.g. RSSI) X
USS/Testbed/SWIM info - - - See above
Pre-flight
In-flight
(@ 1 Hz or greater)
Source could be Testbed, 
USS, GCS, or aircraft
TC2 UAS Services Schematic
Reference 
frame 
conversion
Vehicle Modeling
A. Lumped mass 
model
B. LQR Controller
Trajectory 
Generation
Trajectory 
Prediction
Proximity to static/ 
dynamic obstacles
Remaining battery 
life until EOD NPCRA
GPS 
measurements
P(t), v(t), a(t) Vehicle Properties• Number of rotors,
• Vehicle mass,
• Payload mass,
• Approximate radius of the main vehicle’s body
• Length of each arm (from body center of mass to 
rotor center of mass),
• Weight of rotors and arms
Flight Plan
• Set of waypoints
• ETAs or desired cruise speed
Dynamic re-plan
Battery prognostics
Proximity to obstacles
Other safety 
metrics
Collaboration Areas
• TC2: APT, Nexus
• Models
• Battery & aerodynamics
• GNC models: GPS, control architecture, IMU,
• Any sensors that could become the standard e.g. vibration sensors for motors?
• Lessons learned from moving from APT 20 to APT 70 & APT 400? Important considerations?
• Communication link issues? Frequency bands for operations
• Operator architecture
• Decision making capabilities? Any prognosticator in the loop
• How do their vehicles compare to current developments for UAM? Is there a known standard?
• Other than VTOL, any fixed-wing or hybrid configurations? For our model development.
• Known issues - vehicle, infrastructure, GCS – future safety metric development
• Challenges with airspace integration not necessarily vehicle centric
• Certification or minimum safety requirements for flight from FAA/regulatory body etc?
• RFI, GPS, GRASP(pre-flight or onboard CFS)
• Flights? Where? Frequency? Duration? How autonomous? How many people for remote piloting?
• Low altitude, higher resolution wind estimation and forecasting
• What would they like to see? What do they need help with?
